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I. Introduction 
 
In Korea, there has been a substantial increase in foreigners’ capital participations 
in local financial institutions and this development was especially prominent during 
1999 to 2001. This expansion was mainly due to the need to facilitate the financial 
sector restructuring undertaken in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis by selling off 
a number of not-immediately-viable domestic banks to domestic and foreign bidders. 
It is noteworthy that the typical mode of recent foreign entry to the Korean financial 
sector has been through green-field investment or M&A. In contrast, foreign bank 
entry through the opening of branches, which had been the most important 
organizational form of foreign entry until 1997, began to slow substantially from 
1998.  
Despite the sharp rise in the level of foreign participation in local financial 
institutions in many emerging markets and particularly in the second half of the 
1990s, an increasing body of empirical evidence indicates that it is not wholly clear 
as to whether foreign entry has improved either the efficiency or the stability of 
domestic banking systems. Notably, it seems too early in some emerging markets, 
such as Korea, to draw any definite conclusions about the implications for the 
performance of banks in the sense that they have only very recently come under 
majority foreign ownership. Nevertheless, an attempt appears warranted to gain a 
rough idea as to whether they exhibit any distinctive differences in performance 
relative to other domestic banks on the basis of the financial statements of individual 
banks and anecdotal evidence.  
 Has increased foreign participation actually contributed in any substantial degree 
to improvement in the efficiency and stability of the domestic banking system in 
Korea? This paper aims to shed light on the question. To this end, the second section 
of this paper first reviews the main characteristics of financial sector FDI in Korea. 
The third section evaluates the performance of two foreign-owned banks (Kookmin 
Bank and Korea First Bank) and other private domestic banks by comparing their 
key financial conditions and operating behaviors. We then briefly probe the issue of 
whether there have been any stability effects from foreign bank entry in the form of 
the opening of branches. In addition, we carry out a more definite empirical analysis 
using bank panel data for identifying the efficiency effects of foreign bank entry by 
opening branches and of foreign entry through green field investment and M&A on 
domestic banks in terms of profits and costs.  
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II. Characteristics of Financial Sector FDI  
 
1. Recent Trends in Financial Sector FDI  
From the early 1990s, the Korean government started significantly relaxing its control 
over the financial sector launching a five-year financial liberalization plan in 19931. 
Thus the liberalization process has gained momentum. What is more, the November 
1998 Foreign Investment Promotion Act has made it possible to open up the vast 
majority of Korean business sectors including the financial sector to foreign investors. 
By offering tax and other incentives, the Act aimed at creating a more transparent and 
open environment. It seems apparent that such policies to bolster a liberalized 
investment environment have played a prominent role in provoking a dramatic surge of 
overall FDI into Korea since 1999. It rose sharply to USD 15.6 billion in 1999 from 
USD 8.9 billion in 1998, reaching a peak of USD 15.8 billion in 2000 before beginning 
to drop after 2001. 
 
Table 1                  Financial Sector FDI in Korea 
                                                             USD billion 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 
Overall FDI (A) 2.49 3.65 7.21 8.91 15.57 15.79 11.87 9.10 6.47 
FS FDI (B) 0.98 0.72 0.58 0.64 2.80 2.16 1.81 1.02 1.65 
Banking & 
Securities 
0.38 0.25 0.32 0.51 2.27 1.61 1.65 0.53 
 
- 
 (Branches) 0.54 0.45 0.24 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.002 0.05 - 
 Insurance 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.51 0.45 0.16 0.40 - 
B/A (%) 39.0 19.7 8.0 7.2 18.0 13.7 15.2 11.2 25.5 
A/GDP (%) 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.7 2.2 3.0 - 
                                            
1 It sought to achieve the following major liberalization measures: 1) Interest rate deregulation in four 
stages (from 1991 to July 1997). In accordance with this, all lending and borrowing rates, except 
demand deposit rates, were liberalized by 1997. 2) More managerial autonomy for banks and lower 
entry barriers to financial activities. This measure includes allowing freedom for banks to increase 
capital, to establish branches and to determine dividend payments (1994). At the same time, the 
measures were applicable to foreign banks attempting to open branches. The business scope of financial 
institutions was also enlarged by the expansion of the securities business. 3) Foreign exchange 
liberalization, which involved a detailed schedule for the reform of the foreign exchange market 
structure (1994) and a significant relaxation of the foreign exchange concentration system (1995). 4) 
Capital market opening. This measure allowed foreigners to invest directly in the Korean stock markets 
subject initially to ownership ceilings and to purchase government and public bonds and equity-linked 
bonds issued by SMEs (1994). More importantly, foreign commercial loans were allowed without 
government approval in so far as they meet the guideline established in May 1995. See Ha-Joon Chang 
et al. (2001).           
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE) 
There has also been a marked increase in financial sector FDI in 1999 mainly due to 
the need to facilitate the financial-sector restructuring undertaken in the aftermath of 
the 1997 financial crisis by selling off a number of not-immediately-viable domestic 
banks to domestic and foreign bidders. It soared to USD 2.8 billion in 1999 and 
amounted to USD 2.2 billion in 2000 and USD 1.8 billion in 2001, vastly outpacing the 
average annual level of USD 0.7 billion during 1994 to 1998. 
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Financial sector FDI may be broken down into two categories: Foreign entry to the 
banking sector, the securities and the insurance through green-field investment or 
M&A, and foreign bank entry through opening branches and representative offices. 
Foreign bank subsidiaries2, however, have never been established so far because 
foreign banks have been concentrating on following their customers abroad rather than 
offering a wider range of financial services, such as taking deposits or making loans. It 
is noteworthy that the pattern of foreign entry to the financial sector appears very 
similar to that of financial sector FDI as a whole after the crisis as shown in Table 1. 
Although disaggregated data on the mode of foreign entry to the financial sector are 
                                            
2 It is generally observed that subsidiaries are permitted to engage in a broader range of financial 
services than branches, and in many countries, they are treated and regulated in the same way as 
domestic banks. 
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not available, informal data from the MOCIE (Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Energy) reveals that around 75 per cent of foreign investment in the financial sector in 
2002 was green field investment and the remainder M&A. In contrast, foreign bank 
entry through the opening of branches (and representative offices), which had been the 
most important organizational form of foreign entry until 1997, began to slow 
substantially from 1998. Chart 2 indicates that the increase in financial sector FDI due 
to foreign bank entry through opening branches was relatively strong during the three 
consecutive years from 1995 to 1997. This was apparently driven by the above-
mentioned liberalization process that significantly lowered entry barriers, such as 
abolishing the Economic Needs Test (ENT, April 1994) mandated for foreign banks 
attempting to establish branches and the requirement to establish a representative office 
prior to opening a branch (May 1995). Forty foreign banks originating from fifteen 
countries are currently operating sixty-one branches.3  
The upshot is that foreign entry to the financial sector through green field 
investment and M&A seems to have largely replaced foreign bank entry through 
opening branches since 1999. 
 
Chart 2      Increase in Financial Sector FDI due to Foreign Bank Entry 
through the Opening of Branches 
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3 Of the sixty-one foreign branches in Korea, twenty (32.8 per cent) originated from the United States 
and twenty (32.8 per cent) from European Countries as of the end of 2003. In particular, the personnel of 
the Citibank branches (1,059) plus HSBC branches (287) amounted to 52.2 per cent of the total 
personnel of all foreign bank branches.        
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2. Foreign Ownership of Domestic Banks  
The increase in foreign participation in the financial sector through green field 
investment and M&A mostly after the crisis has led to a high degree of foreign 
ownership with the increasing (minority) stakes and foreign management control of 
domestic banks and securities companies. There are seven major domestic banks - 
Kookmin Bank, Woori Bank, Hana Bank, Shinhan Bank, Korea Exchange Bank (KEB), 
Hanmi Bank, Korea First Bank (KFB). Of these banks, five are foreign-owned banks  
 
Table 2          Foreign Ownership1) in Major Domestic Banks 
 
At the end of 1997 At the end of 2003 
Banks Foreign 
Ownership 
 Major 
 Shareholder 
Foreign 
Ownership
 Major 
 Shareholder 
None  
(KHB:41.2%) 
Government: 
22.4% Kookmin 
Bank 
 
None  
(Kookmin: 
37.0%) 
Government: 
15.2% 
73.6% 
 
Bank of New York:10.4% 
Government: 0.1% 
Goldman Sachs: 1.1% 
ING Group: 3.9% 
[1 ED, 2 ODs] 
Woori 
Bank 
8.6%  Samsung Life 
 Insurance: 6.60
4.5% Woori Financial Group: 100 %
– KDIC:86.8% 
Hana 
Bank2) 
 
21.3% 
 
Kyobo 
Insurance: 
7.7% 
37.2% 
 
KDIC: 21.7% 
Allianz AG: 8.2% 
[2 ODs] 
Shinhan 
Bank3) 
23.4% 
 
 
Koreans 
resident in 
Japan:23.4% 
 
51.8% 
 
 
Shinhan Financial Group: 
100% 
– Citibank N.A.: 4.64% 
– BNP Paribar: 4.6% 
[1OD] 
Korea 
Exchange 
Bank (KEB) 
2.7% BOK: 47.9% 71.0% Lone-Star: 51.0% 
Comerz bank: 14.8% 
[president, 1 vice president,  
5 ODs] 
Hanmi 
Bank 
29.4% 
 
BOA: 18.6% 
 
89.1% 
 
KAI: 15.7% 
[5 ODs] 
Korea First 
Bank 
(KFB) 
0.1% Daehan Life 
Insurance Co. 
Ltd.: 4.9% 
48.6% New Bridge Capital: 48.6% 
[president, 3 vice presidents, 
12 ODs] 
Notes: 1) Foreign ownership and major shareholders are based on data as of the end of 2002. ED and 
OD in square brackets refer to foreign executive directors and foreign outside directors, 
respectively       
     2) Hana Bank took over Seoul Bank in early December 2002 
3) Shinhan Financial Holding Company took over Choheung Bank in December 2003 
Source: Shareholders’ information of individual banks. 
9 
 
where foreigners own more than 50 per cent of shares ranging from 48.6 per cent to 89 
per cent as of the end of 2003. For example, Kookmin Bank, the largest bank in Korea, 
was 73.6 per cent foreign-owned, with the Bank of New York (ADRS) and ING Group 
holding 10.4 per cent and 3.9 per cent of its equity as of the end of 2003.  
This is a remarkable increase in foreign ownership of the major domestic banks, 
compared to the pre-crisis period where foreign ownership remained much less than 30 
per cent as late as the end of 1997. As a result, foreign participation in the control of 
the major domestic banks at senior management level has increased considerably in 
recent years. A foreign president and three foreign vice presidents now directly control 
the KFB with twelve foreign outside directors. Similarly, in the case of Korean 
Exchange Bank a foreign president and one foreign vice president are directly involved 
in management and five foreign outside directors sit on its board. Other major 
domestic banks such as Kookmin Bank and Hanmi Bank also have participated in their 
boards by more than two foreign directors. 
 
3. Regulations and Supervisions Related to Foreign Entry to the  
Domestic Financial Sector  
 
i) Operational Funds of Foreign Bank Branches  
The operational funds of the foreign bank branches are classified as Capital A funds or 
Capital B funds. 
 Capital A funds are recognized as the equity capital of foreign bank attempting to 
open branches in Korea. Thus they may be in line with the financial sector FDI 
associated with foreign bank entry. Capital A funds include local currency denominated 
funds that foreign bank branches must hold through their parent’s sales of funds 
denominated in foreign currency to the Bank of Korea, together with funds transferred 
from the retained earnings carried forward of the incumbent branches for an expansion 
of the branch network. Each foreign branch needs to provide at least KRW 3 billion 
(equivalent to USD 2.5 million) in Capital A funds. Foreign bank branches, however, 
cannot remit Capital A funds in excess of KRW 3 billion to the home country or 
elsewhere without the approval of the FSC. This may be a main reason why most 
foreign bank branches tend to hold no more than KRW 3 billion in Capital A funds even 
though allowed to maintain at least that amount. 
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 Capital B funds represent the sum of the long-term loans4 that foreign branches 
borrow from their parent banks (or other branches abroad) and domestically operate and 
of local currency denominated funds that they hold through sales of funds denominated 
in foreign currency to the BOK under the repurchase agreements. Since Capital B funds 
typically comprise long-term borrowings, they are counted as supplementary capital of 
foreign bank branches. Another reason for allowing Capital B funds as supplementary 
capital involves preventing foreign branches from limiting their scope of operations due 
to a relatively low level of Capital A funds. But foreign bank branches are not permitted 
to hold Capital B funds exceeding 200 per cent of total capital mostly due to concerns 
about the potential effects of over leverage on their soundness.  
 
ii) Limit on the Foreigner Equity Holdings 
In accordance with the November 1998 Foreign Investment Promotion Act, the Korean 
government took major steps to reduce entry barriers to the financial sector. It lifted the 
four-percent limit on the equity of a domestic financial institution that an individual 
foreigner can hold. This applies to foreigners engaging in the financial sector such as 
the banking, securities and insurance sectors. In this instance, their total assets and 
business volume should be recognized as adequate compared to the average level of the 
relevant business sector. Furthermore, their financial status must be maintained 
adequately when evaluated with respect to the BIS capital adequacy ratio (8 per cent) 
and credit ratings by international credit rating agencies. It is possible for a foreigner 
engaging in the financial sector to hold less than 10 per cent of the total equity of a 
domestic financial institution by simply reporting this to the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC).   
A foreigner seeking to establish a joint financial institution or branches in Korea, 
however, can hold more than 10 per cent of the total equity of domestic financial 
institutions provided that approval is obtained from the Financial Supervisory 
Commission. Approval is granted step by step at 25 per cent, 33 per cent and 100 per 
cent level.  
It is noteworthy that Korean nationals are allowed to hold the equity of domestic 
financial institutions by following the same procedure as foreigners, only within the 
specific limit approved by the FSC for foreigners or reported by foreigners. This may 
put foreigners (non-residents) on a better footing than Korean nationals (residents) in 
penetrating the domestic banking sector and competing effectively with domestic banks.  
                                            
4 The Governor of the FSS may deduct long-term loans from Capital B funds if such funds have not 
been operated in Korea 
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III. The Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on the Performance of 
Private Domestic Banks  
 
This section aims to shed light on the efficiency effects of foreign bank entry. To this 
end, we first evaluate the performance of two foreign-owned banks (Kookmin Bank 
and KFB) and other private domestic banks by comparing their key financial 
conditions and operating behaviors. It seems too early to draw any definite conclusion 
about the implications for the performance of banks that have recently come to have 
majority foreign ownership (mostly after 1999). Nevertheless, an attempt appears 
warranted to gain a rough idea as to whether they exhibit any distinctive differences in 
performance relative to other domestic banks on the basis of the financial statements of 
individual banks and anecdotal evidence. We then briefly probe into the issue of 
whether there have been any stability effects from foreign bank entry in the form of the 
opening of branches. In addition, we carry out a more definite empirical analysis using 
bank panel data for identifying the efficiency effects of foreign bank entry by opening 
branches on private domestic banks in terms of profits and costs.      
 
1. An Evaluation of the Performance of Two Foreign-Owned Banks and 
Private Domestic Banks     
 
To compare the performance of foreign-owned banks with those of other domestic 
banks, we first choose two banks that have recently come to have majority foreign 
ownership: Kookmin Bank having the highest foreign ownership (73.6 per cent as of 
the end of 2003) among the five foreign-owned domestic banks and Korea First Bank 
(KFB) which is run by a foreign CEO, with foreign ownership now amounting to 48.6 
per cent.  
Comparing the key financial conditions of these two foreign-owned banks with 
those of other private domestic banks suggests that they have not differed 
systematically in performance in the post-crisis period and foreign-owned banks have 
rather been inferior to the private domestic banks in the areas of loan growth and 
profits. The annual loan growth of the two foreign-owned banks has been broadly 
similar to the average annual loan growth rate of all private domestic banks in 2001, 
although having been substantially less than that of all domestic banks as well as some 
12 
other major banks such as Shinhan Bank in 2002. The annual loan growth of Kookmin 
Bank was 22.9 per cent and 26.5 per cent respectively from the end of 2001 to the end 
of 2002, compared to the 33.6 per cent of all private domestic banks and the 33.7 per 
cent of Shinhan Bank. 
It is worth noting that both Kookmin Bank and KFB have been more aggressive in 
pursuing retail-banking expansion than other private domestic banks since 2000. KFB 
in particular showed a marked increase in the consumer lending-to-total lending ratio 
from mere 20.7 per cent in 1997 to 67.9 per cent in 2003, outpacing the average 
consumer lending ratio (55 per cent in 2003) of all private domestic banks.  
 
Table 3      Consumer Lending Ratios1) of Two Foreign-Owned Banks and  
Domestic Banks 
Per cent 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
KFB 20.7 17.5 22.0 49.1 62.7 65.2 67.9 
Kookmin 
Bank  66.6 61.7 56.9 58.0 63.4 63.7 65.5 
Domestic 
Banks2)   35.5 34.3 36.1 40.8 51.3 54.8 55.0 
Note: 1) Consumer lending-to-total lending ratio 
     2) Nation-wide commercial banks excluding regional banks 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) 
 
The two foreign-owned banks and other private domestic banks have also engaged 
in similar deposit-based funding. Table 4 shows that Kookmin Bank and KFB 
maintained 71.8 per cent and 69.9 per cent of demand deposits to total assets 
respectively as of the end of 2003, slightly higher than the average ratio (68.3 per cent) 
of demand deposits of all private domestic banks. In particular, KFB showed a higher 
share of demand deposits to total deposit, 19.6 per cent, as of the end of 2003, 
compared to the average ratio of all private domestic banks (10 per cent).     
 
Table 4      Funding and Liquid Assets of Two Foreign-Owned Banks 
                                                      Per cent  
 Deposits/total assets1) Liquid assets/total assets2) 
 1997 2001 2002 2003 1997 2001 2002 2003 
Korea First 
Bank  
57.1 66.4 72.2 
(11.3) 
68.9 
(19.6) 
17.1 11.3 9.6 10.2 
Kookmin 
Bank  
- 73.4 71.8 
(10.9) 
71.8 
(11.4) 
- 5.4 3.1 3.8 
Domestic 
Banks4)  
61.0 69.8 69.0 
(10.0) 
68.3 
(10.0) 
18.8 8.1 6.7 7.1 
Notes: 1) Deposit includes deposits in both local currency (Won) and foreign currency  
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2) Liquid assets consist of cash and checks, due from BOK or other banks, foreign currency and 
bills and drafts bought   
3) Demand deposit –to-total deposit ratio is reported in parenthesis      
4) Nation-wide commercial banks excluding regional banks 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) 
 
It seems apparent that there were no compellingly obvious differences in liquid asset 
ratios between these two foreign-owned banks and other private domestic banks in the 
post-crisis period. This pattern may reflect the fact that foreign-owned banks did not 
need to maintain higher liquidity levels because they relied heavily on deposit 
financing. 
 Data on bank profits in Table 5 reveal that Korea First Bank (KFB) in particular 
showed substantially lower ROA and ROE in 2002 than the average ratios of all 
private domestic banks. The ROA and ROE of KFB over the fourth quarter of 2001 
through the fourth quarter of 2002 stood at just 0.4 per cent and 6.3 per cent 
respectively, while the equivalent ratios for all domestic banks remained at 0.6 per cent 
and 11.0 per cent. What is more, the profits of both Kookmin Bank and KFB dropped 
slightly in 2003 mainly due to their higher loan loss provisioning than other domestic 
counterparts.     
There is also the issue of whether increased foreign participation has contributed to 
any operational differences between foreign-owned and other domestic banks. 
Although institutional reform of corporate governance has been pursued including the 
outside directors and audit committees, a qualitative evaluation by the Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS) reveals no significant operational differences between 
foreign-owned and other domestic banks. Primarily, the lack of expertise on the part of 
outside directors and ineffective selection procedures were perceived as underlying the 
allegedly less-than satisfactory functioning of the Board of Directors of most foreign-
owned and domestic banks.  
 
Table 5     ROA and ROE of Foreign-owned Banks and Domestic Banks 
Per cent  
 ROA ROE 
 1997 2001 2002 2003 1997 2001 2002 2003 
Korea First 
Bank  1.1 0.9 0.4 ᅀ0.04 26.8 15.2 6.3 ᅀ0.82 
Kookmin 
Bank  1.0 0.8 0.8 ᅀ0.34 18.0 12.6 13.0 ᅀ6.28 
Domestic 
Banks1)  ᅀ0.5 0.8 0.6 0.1 ᅀ10.8 16.3 11.0 1.99 
Note: 1) Nation-wide commercial banks excluding regional banks 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service (FSS)  
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It has been argued that foreign bank entry makes it possible to improve the quality, 
pricing and availability of financial services in the domestic financial market by 
enabling the application of more modern banking skills and technology (Levine, 1996). 
However, as noted earlier, KFB showed a tendency to concentrate on retail-oriented 
lending, rather than providing enhanced financial services and pursuing portfolio 
diversification through the use of advanced banking technology and skilled banking 
personnel. It seems most likely that KFB has not played satisfactorily the role that had 
been originally hoped for. Kookmin Bank was also by no means outstanding in these 
aspects. What is more, KFB has not been aggressive in addressing non-performing 
loans and asset quality deterioration arising under the foreign CEO’s control. Such 
behavior appears to be closely associated with the ‘put back option’5 that was 
provided to its foreign company upon taking over the previously weak KFB.  
    
2. An Evaluation of the Stability Effects of Foreign Bank Entry through 
the Opening of Branches   
 
Table 6 shows that while the deposit-to-asset ratio for foreign bank branches 
declined somewhat, their proportions in total assets of both borrowings from head 
offices (Due to Head Office and Branches) and derivatives instrument liabilities and 
accounts payable increased in both 2002 and 2003. Note that their borrowings (mostly 
short-term) from their head offices and branches6 (23.7 per cent of total assets) in 
2003, which outpaced deposit-taking (15.5 per cent of total assets), tended to play a 
role as the most important funding sources, together with derivatives instrument 
liabilities and accounts payable (31.7 per cent of total assets). In particular, although 
foreign bank branches showed a decreased deposit ratio after 2002, it seems clear that 
they contributed marginally to the stability of the domestic deposit market at the height 
of the Asian financial crisis. In 1998, domestic depositors tended to shift their funds 
away from finance companies and small banks toward large banks, especially foreign 
banks such as Citibank and HSBC that were perceived as sounder than the local banks, 
                                            
5 This foreign takeover actually took place only subject to the condition that the foreign owners were 
given a positive incentive to resolve non-performing loans. This incentive was that if loans inherited 
from the previously weak KFB that were classified as performing turn sour, these loans could be sold to 
the government. Non-performing loans were then recovered by the bank. However, when the bank is 
able to transform a non-performing loan into a performing loan by restructuring the borrowing firm at 
the time of takeover, it gains from doing so. See Graham (2001). 
6 Such a sharp increase in borrowings from the head offices and branches was due to the branches’ need 
to provide short-term funds denominated in foreign currency for currency swaps with domestic 
insurance companies.  
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which were mostly stricken with bad loans. That this “flight-to-quality” phenomenon 
took place may be confirmed by the increase in 1998 in deposits with foreign bank 
branches, as opposed to domestic banks.7 In the operation of assets, however, foreign 
bank branches exhibited stronger investment securities growth in the years from 2001 
through 2003, with their securities-to-total asset ratio exhibiting high levels ranging 
from 26 to 32 per cent. This reflected an increase in investment in Monetary 
Stabilization Bonds (central bank obligations) and government bonds, due to their need 
 
Table 6             Assets & Liabilities of Foreign Bank Branches 
      Per cent 
European Bank 
Branches 
American Bank 
Branches  
All Foreign 
Branches  2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
Deposit 1) 15.0 13.3 12.4 39.3 36.1 33.0 22.4 18.1 15.5 
Call Money  21.4 18.7 18.9 14.3 11.3 14.9 17.3 13.8 15.0 
Due to  
Head 
Office & 
29.8 28.7 15.2 11.3 17.6 13.1 25.8 32.2 23.7 
Liabili-
ties Derivatives 
Instrument 
Liabilities & 
Accounts 
Payable 
6.1 13.6 11.1 7.0 10.2 9.1 20.6 22.7 31.7 
Securities 30.7 41.3 34.9 26.9 27.1 18.9 26.9 31.7 26.2 
Loans2)  16.1 16.6 12.6 23.0 20.9 20.3 20.9 23.8 21.0 
Bills 
Bought 
in Foreign 
Currency 
5.1 4.1 3.3 7.3 4.3 3.9 7.1 5.2 5.0 
Assets 
Derivatives 
Instrument 
Assets & 
Accounts 
Receivables 
22.0 25.1 38.1 20.7 24.5 29.8 19.2 21.0 31.3 
 Notes:  1) CDs included 
                                            
7 Deposits of domestic banks and foreign bank branches are as follows 
                                                               unit : USD billon   
                       1996    1997   1998    1999    2000    2001   2002 
Domestic commercial banks:   326.4   353.7   251.4    298.2   337.1   266.7   288.6 
                          (16.9)   (8.4)   (-28.9)   (18.6)   (13.0)  (-20.9)   (8.2) 
Foreign bank branches:         3.8     3.8     3.9     5.2      7.1     8.8    10.0 
                          (-2.2)    (-1.1)   (4.2)   (31.7)    (37.8)  (22.6)   (13.6) 
 
* Annual growth rate of deposits in parenthesis  
16 
2) Inter-bank loans in foreign currency are included   
Source: Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) 
 
 
to hedge foreign exchange and interest rate risk resulting from increase in currency 
swaps with domestic insurance companies and the enlargement of their country limits 
on investment in securities.  
Foreign bank branches showed relative weakness in profits through 2002, as is 
revealed by the fact that both their ROAs and ROEs fell sharply in 2002 to levels much 
lower than those of domestic banks. This is because their non-interest income, such as 
gains on foreign currency trading and trading of derivatives, was reduced mainly due 
to strengthened competition among foreign bank branches and to the improved 
creditworthiness of domestic banks (Table 7). However, foreign banks maintained 
higher share of liquid assets through 2003, in comparison with domestic banks. This 
reflected their relatively larger investments in liquid and lower-risk assets such as 
MSBs and government bonds. They also consistently maintained lower non-
performing loan ratios and higher risk-based capital ratios than domestic banks, 
although domestic banks also showed improvement in those indicators over the past 
three years. These findings provide some support for the view that the overall financial 
conditions and performances of foreign bank branches tend to be stronger than those of 
domestic banks. In addition, it seems most likely that greater foreign bank participation 
contributed to the increased banking competition, as evidenced by the reduced non-
interest income from the trading of foreign currency and derivatives, and thereby to 
reduced profits. 
 
Table 7             Major Indicators of Bank Performance 
Per cent 
Foreign Bank Branches Domestic Banks  
2000 2001 2002 20033) 2000 2001 2002 20033) 
ROA1) 1.58 1.06 0.50 0.57 ᅀ0.54 0.80 0.56 0.1 
ROE1) 18.14 13.27 7.59 8.01 ᅀ0.81 16.30 10.95 1.99 
Liquidity 
Ratio2) 114.0 129.6 136.08 125.55 113.9 100.6 111.0 109.51
NPL Ratio 1.03 1.11 0.56 0.76 6.6 2.9 2.0 2.19 
BIS Capital 
Ratio 26.82 27.62 19.88 24.85
3) 10.53 10.81 10.52 10.73) 
Notes: 1) Both ROEs and ROAs are ratios over the relevant periods  
2) Liquidity ratio refers to the proportion to total liquid liabilities of liquid assets   
3) Figures are based on data as of the end of September 2003 
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Source: Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) 
 
A key issue to examine is whether movements in foreign banks’ lending were more 
closely tied to economic conditions than those in domestic banks. Chart 3, which 
compares real GDP growth rates with the loan growth rates of foreign bank branches 
and private domestic banks, indicates that foreign bank branches did not “cut and run” 
when faced with the severe economic slowdown in 1998 following the financial crisis, 
despite the fact that domestic banks did cut off credit lines to their customers. However, 
they tended to cut back on lending substantially when economic recovery was under 
way in 1999, in sharp contrast with domestic banks. This result suggests that the 
lending pattern of foreign bank branches over the post-crisis period in particular tended 
to be counter-cyclical, with that of domestic banks being more or less pro-cyclical. It is 
nevertheless by no means clear that foreign bank branches played a role of mitigating 
the pro-cyclical pattern of lending by private domestic banks and, in particular thereby 
contributed somewhat to the Korean economy’s withstanding the severe slowdown 
following the crisis, in the sense that the scale of lending by foreign bank branches in 
fact remains very small relative to that of domestic banks (Table 8).  
 
Chart 3    Comparison of Real GDP Growth Rates with Loan Growth Rates 
between Foreign Bank Branches and Private Domestic Banks 
- 30
- 20
- 10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
- 15
- 10
- 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Private Domestic Banks
Foreign Bank Branches 
GDP Growth Rates
 (%) (%)
       Source: Banking Statistics, Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 Table 8    Total Lending of Foreign Bank Branches and Private Domestic Banks   
USD billion, per cent 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Domestic 
Banks1) 201.5 126.2 169.2 212.4 206.7 285.0 
Foreign 
Bank 
Branches 
8.8 
 
7.0 
 
6.6 
 
7.9 
(3.6) 
7.4 
(3.4) 
6.7 
(2.3) 
Note: 1) Nine nation-wide commercial banks excluding regional banks   
2) Total lending of foreign bank branches to that of all private domestic banks ratio is reported 
in parenthesis  
Source: Banking Statistics, Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) 
 
There has also been concern about the issue of whether foreign bank branches show 
a tendency of “cherry picking” the most creditworthy domestic firms and individuals. 
From the findings of one of the most recent FSS audits, it seems apparent that most 
foreign bank branches in Korea tend to concentrate on wholesale banking such as trade 
finance and project finance, and private banking such as custody business and cash 
management service (CMS) as well as on trade of foreign exchange, bonds and 
derivative products. In particular, Citibank and HSCB have also tended to undertake 
retail-banking activities. These foreign banks, however, have been targeting the 
creditworthy domestic customers, while focusing especially on more stringent loan 
enforcements than domestic banks by using advanced credit risk evaluation methods. 
Under these conditions, it appears not totally implausible that domestic banks have 
been led to deal with less creditworthy (more risky) customers such as SMEs8 and to 
thus increase the overall riskiness of their portfolios. Consistent with foreign banks’ 
cherry-picking strategy, HSBC, one of the leading foreign banks currently operating in 
Korea, exhibited a markedly low overdue mortgage loan ratio of 0.28 per cent as of the 
end of 2002, compared to the equivalent ratio of 2.0 per cent recorded at Kookmin 
Bank.9 The reason why HSBC had such a low overdue loan ratio may be traced back 
to several factors. First, it was able to enter the mortgage loan market earlier than 
Kookmin Bank and preempt creditworthy customers, while offering mortgage loans at 
the lowest lending rate. Second, it also showed more defensive behavior in offering 
                                            
8 This result may have arisen in part from the fact that the mandatory ratio for lending to SMEs has 
since February 1999 been set lower for foreign bank branches at 35 per cent than the equivalent ratios 
for commercial banks and regional banks, which are 45 per cent and 60 per cent respectively.     
9 HSBC also showed a low overdue consumer loan ratio of 0.85 per cent as of the end of 2003, 
compared to the equivalent ratio of 2.35 per cent at Kookmin Bank.  
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mortgage loans (primarily long-term) – keeping its loan-to-value ratio at no more than 
60 per cent over the past two years, even when major domestic banks including 
Kookmin Bank raised it up to 70 to 80 per cent.  
Overall, it is not wholly clear as to whether a greater foreign bank presence 
contributed to a more stable banking system. Even though they tended to mitigate the 
pro-cyclical pattern of lending by domestic banks, the overall scale of lending by 
foreign bank branches remained very small relative to that of domestic banks. They 
also sought to cherry pick the most creditworthy customers. 
 
3. Empirical Evidence of Efficiency Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on 
Private Domestic Banks10 
 
i) Efficiency Effects of Foreign Bank Entry through the Opening of 
Branches   
 
We first turn to the question of whether foreign bank entry through the opening of 
branches had some significant effects on both profits and costs of private domestic 
banks (nationwide banks and regional banks combined) by competing with them in the 
loan market. To address the question, we estimated the following regression equation 
using panel data. Data used cover from 1987 to 2000 on an annual basis.  
 
Econometric specification and data 
 
Yi,t = αi + γXi,t + δFBi,t  + ξi,t 
i = 1, ….,N,   t=1,….,T. 
 
Where the lower subscript i represents the individual local banks existing in each year t 
and t covers from 1987 to 2000 (fourteen years), Yi,t is a measure to proxy for the 
performance of a local bank i in a given year t, FBi,t refers to the foreign bank 
penetration through the opening of branches in a given year t and Xi,t denotes a vector 
of the control variables other than FBi,t that might affect the local banks’ performance. 
We selected the average amount of total loans made by foreign bank branches as a 
percentage of the average amount of loans made by local bank i to proxy for FBi,t. Here 
foreign banks originate from twelve countries: the United States, Japan, France, the 
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United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Netherlands, Germany, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
India and Pakistan. These countries are selected because they have maintained at least 
one local branch in Korea every year during the sample period. The level of return on 
assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE), standard measures of profit, was used as the 
dependent variable to capture the effects of foreign bank penetration through the 
opening of branches to the local loan market on local banks’ profits. To gain an insight 
into whether the foreign bank entry through the opening of branches raises the cost 
efficiency of the local banks, either operating expenses relative to total assets (EXP) or 
total costs relative to total assets (TCOST) was included as the dependent variable. The 
control variables considered comprise both micro and macro factors11. Micro factors 
involve the following bank characteristics of individual local banks expressed as 
percentages of total assets: equity capital/total assets (CAP), securities holding/total 
assets (SEC), bank loan/total assets (LOAN), fixed assets/total assets (FIX) and 
allowance for credit loss/total assets (PROV). In particular, operating expenses as a 
percentage of total assets (EXP) was considered as an explanatory variable when the 
dependent variable was either ROA or ROE. The growth rate of real GDP (RGDP), the 
inflation rate based on the Consumer Price Index (INF) and the real interest rate 
(RINT) were selected to control for macro conditions.12 
 
Empirical Results 
A pretest indicates that most of the correlation coefficients between independent 
variables are generally found to be much lower than 0.7. This may suggest that 
including all independent variables in the regression equation would not pose any 
serious problem of multi-collinearity. 
The results are shown in Table 9. In the profit equations ([1] and [2]), FB, the 
primary interest of this analysis, does not have a significant positive coefficient. The 
result confirms that both ROA and ROE proxied for the profits of local banks’ 
activities appear not to be dependent on foreign bank penetration through the opening 
of branches to the local loan market in an important way. However, the coefficient 
estimate of FB in the expenditure equation [3] turns out to be significantly negative at 
the 5 per cent level. This may imply that allowing foreign banks to enter through 
opening branches more likely helps improve the efficiency of domestic banks in terms  
                                            
11 See Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998). 
12 Bank characteristics used are taken from the Bank Management Statistics issued by the Financial 
Supervisory Service of Korea and the Monthly Research and Statistics issued by the Bank of Korea for 
the bank loan amount of foreign bank branches. Macro-economic indicators are from the Monthly 
Research and Statistics. 
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Table 9        The Effects of Foreign Bank Entry through the Opening of Branches 
on the Performance of Private Domestic Banks (1987∼2000) 
 
Number [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Estimation method Random effects Random effects Fixed effects Random effects 
Dependent variable ROA ROE EXP TCOST 
Constant -2.3182 (-1.46) 
-34.8496 
(-0.71) -  
 10.8328*** 
(4.35) 
CAP 0.1069
*** 
(3.01) 
3.0520*** 
(2.78) 
0.0058 
(0.46) 
-0.2300*** 
(-4.07) 
SEC -0.0495
** 
(-2.18) 
-1.9437*** 
(-2.74) 
0.0075 
(0.91) 
0.1860*** 
(4.91) 
LOAN -0.0137 (-0.55) 
-0.1690 
(-0.22) 
0.0316*** 
(3.40) 
0.0179 
(0.50) 
FIX -0.2615
*** 
(-2.67) 
-7.8413** 
(-2.59) 
0.1679*** 
(8.26) 
0.5733*** 
(5.22) 
PROV 0.0248 (0.19) 
10.7096*** 
(2.66) 
-0.0094 
(-0.48) 
0.1364 
(0.64) 
EXP 1.1639
*** 
(3.07) 
17.5733 
(1.55)  - -  
RGDP 0.1691
*** 
(4.58) 
1.3806 
(1.19) 
0.0276*** 
(3.89) 
-0.4105*** 
(-6.63) 
INF 0.0930 (1.31) 
2.0463 
(0.92) 
0.0435*** 
(2.63) 
-0.1396 
(-1.19) 
RINT 0.0269 (0.40) 
2.0056 
(0.95) 
0.0100 
(0.82) 
-0.0766 
(-0.66) 
FB 0.0042 (0.47) 
-0.0413 
(-0.15) 
-0.0053** 
(-2.30) 
-0.0252** 
(-2.01) 
No. of obs. 172 172 173 173 
Adj-R2 0.56 0.27 0.84 0.57 
F-test 6.84 3.33 13.53 4.21 
Hausman test W = 9.55 W = 5.64 W = 19.39 W = 10.89 
Notes:1) t-value calculated with White(1980) Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less, ** between 1 
and 5 percent, and * between 5 and 10 per cent.  
2) F-value is used for examining the hypothesis that an individual country has the same constant 
terms. 
3) The Hausman test statistics will be distributed asymptotically as χ2 with k (the number of 
independent variables) degree of freedom under the null hypothesis that the random effects 
estimator is correct. Note that the chi-squared test is based on the Wald criterion.  
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of costs presumably through competition with foreign banks which would in turn induce 
domestic banks to cut down on operating expenditures.13 This evidence seems to be 
broadly in line with the hypothesis that foreign bank entry through the opening of 
branches tends to render the domestic banking market more competitive and thereby 
force domestic banks to operate more efficiently. In particular, LOAN and FIX 
variables representing bank characteristics as well as key macroeconomic indicators 
(RGDP and INF) have the expected positive signs. Not surprisingly, there are no 
substantial differences in the results for replacing TCOST as a dependent variable with 
EXP in equation [4]. In fact, foreign bank entry (FB) also has a significant negative sign 
in equation [4], while some control variables such as CAP and RGDP have the 
unexpected negative signs, as opposed to the results in equation [3]. 
Overall, as the evidence in Table 9 reveals, foreign bank penetration through the 
opening of branches to the domestic banking sector did contribute to greater cost 
efficiency on the part of private domestic banks, presumably by intensifying 
competitive pressures. But there is no evidence that foreign bank entry has improved 
local banks’ profits.14 One plausible explanation for these seemingly odd results may 
be that cost efficiency resulting from foreign bank entry through the opening of 
branches has been overshadowed by the accompanying profit reduction. 
We also estimated the regression equation (1) over the past pre-crisis period from 
1987 to 1997 and then compared the results presented in Table 10 with those in Table 9, 
with a view to taking into consideration any structural change in the Korean financial 
market that may have occurred in the aftermath of the crisis. As it turns out, the 
coefficient of FB in each equation estimated over the pre-crisis period did not 
substantially differ from that estimated over the whole period. This may be interpreted 
as meaning that the 1997 financial crisis has not changed domestic banking system 
                                            
13 This evidence appears to be consistent with the findings of Claessens-Demirguc Kunt-Huizinga 
(1998), which indicate that there is some evidence that the overall expenses of domestic banks are 
negatively affected by foreign bank entry. They interpreted these results as arising from their greater 
efforts to achieve cost efficiency as they assimilate superior banking techniques and practices of foreign 
entrants. 
14 Hwang et al.(2001) also tested whether the foreign banks’ entry did affect domestic banks’ 
profitability using either asset share or deposit share as a measure of foreign penetration. However, they 
found that the foreign penetration through opening branches reduced domestic banks’ profitability 
presumably due to strengthened competition among domestic banks.         
23 
efficiency in terms of both profits and costs significantly enough for a different 
conclusion to be arrived from that above. 
  
Table 10       The Effects of Foreign Bank Entry through the Opening of Branches 
on the Performance of Private Domestic Banks(1987∼1997) 
 
 Number [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Estimation method Fixed effects Random effects Random effects Fixed effects 
Dependent variable ROA ROE EXP TCOST 
Constant  - 9.4208 (0.71) 
 -0.5499 
(-1.32)   - 
CAP 0.0365
* 
(1.71) 
0.4023* 
(1.67) 
0.0059 
(0.76) 
-0.1532*** 
(-3.81) 
SEC -0.0644
*** 
(-4.51) 
-0.2290 
(-1.22) 
0.0227*** 
(4.12) 
0.1287*** 
(5.34) 
LOAN -0.0346
** 
(-2.49) 
0.1942 
(1.16) 
0.0252*** 
(4.81) 
0.0546** 
(2.42) 
FIX -0.0387 (-0.69) 
-0.2784 
(-0.42) 
0.1507*** 
(9.24) 
0.1624** 
(2.19) 
PROV -0.2382 (-0.94) 
-6.9234*** 
(-3.08) 
0.1185* 
(1.73) 
1.8578*** 
(5.68) 
EXP 1.2485
*** 
(5.13) 
 0.9864 
(0.45) -   - 
RGDP 0.0057 (0.22) 
0.8448* 
(1.75) 
0.0323** 
(2.31) 
-0.0603 
(-1.30) 
INF 0.0666
** 
(2.45) 
0.3123 
(0.53) 
0.0112 
(0.65) 
0.1828*** 
(3.65) 
RINT -0.1144
* 
(-1.87) 
-2.7747*** 
(-3.71) 
-0.0460** 
(-2.19) 
0.5477*** 
(5.73) 
FB 0.0052 (1.33) 
0.0298 
(0.50) 
-0.0070*** 
(-4.35) 
-0.0158*** 
(-2.67) 
No. of obs. 137 137 138 138 
Adj-R2  0.63 0.23 0.83 0.77 
F-test 10.95 3.64 13.72 15.81 
Hausman test W = 31.65 W = 9.13 W = 16.79 W = 55.25 
Notes: 1) t-value calculated with White Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors is reported in 
parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 
and 5 percent; * between 5 and 10 per cent 
2) F-value is used for examining the hypothesis that an individual country has the same constant 
terms. 
3) The Hausman test statistics will be distributed asymptotically as χ2 with k (the number of 
independent variables) degree of freedom under the null hypothesis that the random effects 
estimator is correct. Note that the chi-squared test is based on the Wald criterion.  
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ii) Efficiency Effects of Increased Foreign Ownership of Domestic 
Banks   
 
Next we turn to another empirical analysis for identifying the effects on the 
performance of private domestic banks of foreign entry mostly through green-field 
investment and M&A after the 1997 financial crisis. To this end, we estimated the 
following regression equation using panel data that cover from 1999 to 2001 on an 
annual basis.   
 
Econometric specification and data 
 
Yi,t = αi + γXi,t + δF0i,t  + ξi,t 
i = 1, ….,N,   t=1999, 2000, 2001. 
 
where the lower subscript i denotes the individual domestic banks existing in each year t. 
All dependent variables and control variables considered here other than F0i,t are the 
same as those in both Table 9 and 10. F0i,t denotes foreigner ownership of the private 
domestic banks (nationwide banks and regional banks combined). T covers from 1999 
to 2001 (three years) due to a paucity of F0i,t data. Note that the regression equations 
using panel data were estimated on the basis of the fixed effects due to the small size of 
the sample data.15     
Table 11 reports the results of regressions investigating the effects of foreign 
ownership of individual domestic banks on their efficiency in terms of both profits and 
costs. Table 11 shows that the foreign ownership variable (F0) has a significant 
negative coefficient in the profit equations ([9] and [10]), indicating that the private 
domestic banks having higher levels of foreign ownership registered lower profits. This 
result may reflect the fact that these banks seemed more willing to address asset quality 
deterioration and hence took higher loan provisions rather than pursuing a strategy of 
recording high profits. Additionally, the estimated coefficients of the foreign ownership 
variable (F0) in the cost equations ([11] and [12]) turned out to be insignificantly 
negative and very small. This suggests that the foreign ownership of individual 
                                            
15 When the sample size is relatively small, it is not instructive to rely on a Hausman test to decide 
which model to use. In general, the fixed effects estimator still produces consistent estimates of the 
identifiable parameters when the random effects model is preferred. Furthermore, the fixed effects 
estimator produces efficient estimates when the fixed effects treatment suffers from a problem of 
omitted variables. 
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domestic banks, meanwhile, did not lead to cost reduction in recent years.  
 
Thus the findings may be supportive of a potential for the foreign ownership of 
private domestic banks to contribute to the greater soundness of the domestic banking 
system.                    
 
Table 11      The Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on the Performance of  
Private Domestic Banks (1999∼2001) 
 
 
Number [9] [10] [11] [12] 
Estimation method Fixed effects Fixed effects  Fixed effects Fixed effects  
Dependent variable ROA ROE EXP TCOST 
CAP 3.4101 (1.38) 
3.6539*** 
(4.31) 
-0.0031 
(-0.22) 
-0.5523 
(-1.03) 
SEC -5.3795 (-0.67) 
5.0873 
(0.18) 
0.0151** 
(2.55) 
0.4486** 
(2.54) 
LOAN -4.2729
*** 
(-4.14) 
-1.7563*** 
(-4.58) 
0.0050 
(1.07) 
0.9677*** 
(4.94) 
FIX 3.0242
** 
(2.44) 
1.1890** 
(2.71) 
0.1731*** 
(4.50) 
-3.4272** 
(-2.45) 
PROV -3.3873 (-0.29) 
7.5037* 
(2.07) 
0.0076 
(0.82) 
0.0622 
(0.17) 
EXP 3.2453 (1.23) 
-2.6279 
(-0.32)  - -  
RGDP 0.3116 (1.48) 
1.5386* 
(1.88) 
0.0067 
(0.50) 
-0.0012 
(-0.35) 
INF 2.5868
*** 
(3.55) 
1.0776*** 
(3.60) 
0.0003 
(0.85) 
-0.0275** 
(-2.67) 
FO -0.0631
** 
(-2.49) 
-2.1598** 
(-2.36) 
-0.0076 
(-0.04) 
-0.0009 
(-1.56) 
No. of obs. 48 48 48 48 
Adj-R2 0.54 0.67 0.92 0.54 
Notes: 1) t-value calculated with White (1980) Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors is reported 
in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 
1 and 5 percent; * between 5 and 10 per cent. 
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IV. Concluding Remarks  
 
In this paper, we focused on addressing the question of whether increased foreign 
participation actually led to improvement in the efficiency and the stability of the 
domestic banking sector in Korea. A number of major findings can be drawn as follows.  
First, comparing the key financial indicators of two foreign-owned banks (Kookmin 
Bank and Korea First Bank (KFB)) with those of other private domestic banks reveals 
that there were no compellingly obvious differences in profits in 2001 and 2002. 
Notably, KFB showed lower ROA and ROE in 2002 than the average ratios for private 
domestic banks as a whole. These two foreign-owned banks have been more aggressive 
in pursuing retail banking expansion, rather than providing enhanced financial services 
or pursuing portfolio diversification through the use of advanced banking services and 
skilled banking personnel. It also appears that they showed no significant operational 
differences in terms of corporate governance, compared to private domestic banks.  
 Second, it is by no means clear as to whether a greater foreign bank presence 
contributed to a more stable banking system. Even though they tended to mitigate the 
pro-cyclical pattern of lending by domestic banks, the overall scale of lending by 
foreign bank branches in fact remained very small relative to that of domestic banks. 
They also sought to cherry pick the most creditworthy customers. Thus it appears not 
totally implausible that domestic banks have been led to deal with less creditworthy 
customers such as SMEs, and hence increase the overall riskiness of their portfolios.   
Third, empirical analysis to address the question of whether foreign bank penetration 
through the opening of branches had some efficiency effects on private domestic banks 
reveals that it did contribute to greater cost efficiency on the part of private domestic 
banks, presumably by intensifying competitive pressures. But there is no evidence that 
foreign bank entry has improved local banks’ profits. One plausible explanation for 
these results may be that cost efficiency resulting from foreign bank entry through the 
opening of branches has been overshadowed by the accompanying profit reduction.     
Finally, we also investigated the effects of foreign ownership of individual domestic 
banks on their efficiency. This revealed that private domestic banks having higher levels 
of foreign ownership registered lower profits. This result may be associated with the 
fact that these banks seemed more willing to address asset quality deterioration and 
hence took higher loan provisions rather than pursuing a strategy of registering larger 
profits. It was found, however, that the foreign ownership of individual banks did not 
lead to cost reduction in recent years. Overall, the findings may suggest a potential for 
the foreign ownership of private domestic banks to contribute to the greater soundness 
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of the domestic banking system.  
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